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The Law of the Land: New 




As to ghosts or spirits they appear totally banished from Canada. This is 
too matter-of-fact country for such supernaturals to visit. Here there are 
no historical associations, no legendary tales of those that came before 
us. Fancy would starve for lack of marvellous food to keep her alive in 
the backwoods. We have neither fay nor fairy, ghost nor bogle, satyr nor 
wood-nymph; our very forests disdain to shelter dryad or hamadryad. No 
naiad haunts the rushy margin of our lakes, or hallows with her presence 
our forest-rills. No Druid claims our oaks; and instead of poring with 
mysterious awe among our curious limestone rocks, that are often 
singularly grouped together, we refer them to the geologist to exercise his 
skill in accounting for their appearance: instead of investing them with 
the solemn characters of ancient temples or heathen altars, we look upon 
them with the curious eye of natural philosophy alone. 




The Supreme Court of Canada has stressed time and again that a 
fundamental purpose of the recognition of Aboriginal rights within the 
Canadian legal system is reconciliation: on the one hand, there is the fact 
of “the prior occupation of North America by distinctive aboriginal 
                                                                                                                                  
*  B.A. (Yale), J.D. (Osgoode), B.CL (Oxon.), Associate at Olthuis Kleer Townshend LLP. 
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the firm or 
its clients. I am grateful to Margaret Herrick, Nancy Kleer, Martin Olszynski, Kent McNeil, Roger 
Townshend, Howard Kislowicz, Aaron Mills and two anonymous reviewers for their very detailed 
and insightful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. 
1  Catherine Parr Traill, The Backwoods of Canada: letters from the wife of an emigrant 
officer, illustrative of the domestic economy of British North America (London: Charles Knight, 
1836), at 153-54 [hereinafter “Parr Traill”]. I am indebted to Margaret Herrick for bringing this 
passage to my attention, and for many revelatory discussions that have inspired this paper. 
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societies”,
2
 societies that “lived on the land … with their own practices, 
traditions and cultures”,
3
 which is to be reconciled with the assertion of 
Crown sovereignty over Canadian territory on the other hand.
4
 In a 
subsequent formulation, the Court said that the reconciliation is to be 
between “aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal peoples and their respective 
claims, interests and ambitions”.
5
 Although the reconciliation of Aboriginal 
peoples to Crown claims of sovereignty is quite a different idea than the 
reconciliation of the broken relationship between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal Canadians, both ideas are engaged in the newest decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia.
6
 
Within Canadian law, the concept of Aboriginal title serves as a 
major gatekeeper of this reconciliation. “Assertion of Crown sovereignty”, 
in the Court’s language,
7
 describes the imposition of a colonial legal 
order that began to deny the land rights of Indigenous peoples. 
“Aboriginal title” is the way the Canadian legal system articulates the 
land rights of Indigenous people. The Canadian legal order assumes the 
validity of the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty
8
 and understands it as the 
status quo against which claims by Aboriginal peoples are to be 
measured, and it is the Aboriginal parties in litigation who have the 
burden of proof of showing their presence. What does this assertion look 
like on the ground, as it were? The above epigraph is from one of the 
most popular “emigrant guides” for European settlers arriving in Upper 
Canada, a genre that flourished in the mid-19th century, and encapsulates 
this vision well. The colonial vision of a “blank slate” on the land, of a 
“matter-of-fact country”, is in fact diametrically opposed to how many 
First Nations see the land.
9
 Almost two centuries later, Canadian law 
                                                                                                                                  
2  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 81 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”]. 
3  R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at para. 31 (S.C.C.). 
4  Delgamuukw, supra, note 2, at para. 81. 
5  Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J. No. 71, 
2005 SCC 69, at para. 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mikisew Cree”]. 
6  [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in Nation”]. 
7  Delgamuukw, supra, note 2. 
8  R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1103 (S.C.C.). 
9  See, e.g., Delgamuukw, supra, note 2, at paras. 13-14; Squamish Indian Band v. British 
Columbia (Minister of Sustainable Resource Management), [2004] B.C.J. No. 2143, 2004 BCSC 
1320 (B.C.S.C.); Darlene Johnston, “Respecting and Protecting the Sacred”, paper prepared for the 
Ipperwash Inquiry (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2006), online: <http://www.  
attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/ipperwash/policy_part/research/pdf/Johnston_Respecting- 
and-Protecting-the-Sacred.pdf> [hereinafter “Johnston”]. For examples of such conflicts since 
Professor Johnston’s paper was written, see Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 
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(cl)aims to do better. Although certain crucial aspects of the Canadian legal 
system, such as the recognition of the validity of the Crown’s assertion of 
sovereignty, will always have an imperialistic character, the way in which 
Canadian law mediates the interaction between Crown and Indigenous legal 
orders, and the framing of those interactions as the rights of Indigenous 
peoples, can make a difference on the relationship between Indigenous and 
settler communities. Our contemporary legal concept of Aboriginal title is 
meant to provide an opportunity to Indigenous peoples to litigate and 
negotiate with the colonial state for recognition of those rights, to aim for a 
different way for Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities to live 
together in Canada in the future. 
The new Supreme Court decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation, released in 
June 2014, powerfully affirms the intention of the Court to move the 
Canadian legal system away from the “blank slate” envisaged by colonial 
ideology. In unequivocally rejecting the “postage stamp” theory of 
Aboriginal title put forward by the Crown, and adopted by the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal,
10
 the Supreme Court decision is a reaffirmation 
of earlier jurisprudence which had envisaged the Aboriginal title 
jurisprudence as a way of negotiating a more just relationship between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians. It is also a reaffirmation of a 
centuries-old tradition within British colonial law of recognizing the land 
rights of Indigenous peoples, and represents another nail in the coffin of 
Victorian-era imperialistic fictions that pretended Aboriginal people did 
not exist, and which upended the earlier colonial legal order. In this way, 
Tsilhqot’in Nation reaffirms the law of the land. 
This paper will sketch out the development of the doctrine of 
Aboriginal title, including through judicial decisions and historical 
treaties, to show the importance of the crossroads at which the Court 
found itself, and to show the significance of the path that it has chosen. It 
will then touch on what implications these developments may have for 
                                                                                                             
[2008] B.C.J. No. 2089, 2008 BCSC 1505 (B.C.S.C.); British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. 
Okanagan Indian Band, [2008] B.C.J. No. 454, 2008 BCCA 107 (B.C.C.A.); Brokenhead Ojibway 
First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] F.C.J. No. 608, 2009 FC 484 (F.C.); Wahgoshig 
First Nation v. Ontario, [2012] O.J. No. 22, 2011 ONSC 7708 (Ont. S.C.J.); and Ktunaxa Nation 
Council v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), [2014] 
B.C.J. No. 584, 2014 BCSC 568 (B.C.S.C.). For another detailed and illuminating discussion of such 
conflicts, see Michael Lee Ross, First Nations Sacred Sites in Canada’s Courts (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2005), especially Ch. 3-4 [hereinafter “Ross”]. 
10  Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2012] B.C.J. No. 1302, 2012 BCCA 285 
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in Nation (C.A.)”]. 
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the objective of reconciliation more broadly speaking. It will argue that 
the reaffirmation of the importance of Indigenous legal orders to the 
Canadian legal system suggests a promising direction that the 
jurisprudence can take. This path affords the Canadian legal system an 
opportunity to reaffirm that true reconciliation — one that recognizes 
Aboriginal societies as rule-governed legal orders — is indeed what 
Canadian law aims for. In this way, the law of the land does not need to 
be an imperialist project, but one that honours the place of Aboriginal 
peoples in the Canadian Constitution. An analogy is made to English 
ecclesiastical law and its place within the English legal system to suggest 
a practical form that the recognition of Indigenous legal orders by the 
Canadian legal system can take. 
Space only permits a consideration of the approach in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation to the sufficiency of occupation necessary to make out Aboriginal 
title; the wealth of other issues touched on by the case must unfortunately 
be left for other commentary. 
II. ABORIGINAL TITLE: HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
In Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Supreme Court forcefully rejected the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal’s vision of Aboriginal title. The Court 
of Appeal had held that Aboriginal title is confined to “specific sites on 
which hunting, fishing, or resource extraction activities took place on a 
regular and intensive basis”. For the Court of Appeal, examples of land 
that would qualify for Aboriginal title “might include salt licks, narrow 
defiles between mountains and cliffs, particular rocks or promontories 
used for netting salmon, or, in other areas of the country, buffalo 
jumps”.
11
 In opposition to the “territorial conception” of Aboriginal title, 
this has been dubbed the “postage stamp” theory.
12
 The “postage stamp” 
conception was soundly rejected by the Supreme Court in favour of the 
territorial conception. This part of this paper will contextualize this 
debate to show the significance of the road not taken by the Court. 
In the centuries of transactions and litigation regarding Aboriginal 
ownership of the land, it is difficult to locate any reference to the idea 
that First Nations only had title over small, “postage stamp” pieces of 
land. At the early stages of British colonization in North America, 
                                                                                                                                  
11  Id., at para. 221. 
12  Id., at paras. 64-65. 
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purchasing lands from Indigenous communities was the normal course of 
acquisition of land for the settler communities.
13
 At certain points, war 
was also used as a tool by settler communities to displace Indigenous 
communities. But in either case, the fact of Indigenous presence on the 
land, and their right to that presence, were recognized by the act of 
purchase or by that of war. Both are quite different from the presumption 
that the land was terra nullius, a land belonging to no one. The fictive 
aspect of colonial claims to sovereignty is well described by Chief 
Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in 1832, in the 
landmark case of Worcester v. Georgia: 
Soon after Great Britain determined on planting colonies in America, 
the King granted charters to companies of his subjects, who associated 
for the purpose of carrying the views of the Crown into effect, and of 
enriching themselves. The first of these charters was made before 
possession was taken of any part of the country. They purport generally 
to convey the soil, from the Atlantic to the South Sea. This soil was 
occupied by numerous and warlike nations, equally willing and able to 
defend their possessions. The extravagant and absurd idea that the 
feeble settlements made on the sea-coast, or the companies under 
whom they were made, acquired legitimate power by them to govern 
the people, or occupy the lands from sea to sea, did not enter the mind 
of any man. They were well understood to convey the title which, 
according to the common law of European sovereigns respecting 
America, they might rightfully convey, and no more. This was the 
exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to 
sell. The Crown could not be understood to grant what the Crown did 
not affect to claim, nor was it so understood. 
Certain it is, that our history furnishes no example, from the first 
settlement of our country, of any attempt, on the part of the Crown, to 
interfere with the internal affairs of the Indians farther than to keep out 
the agents of foreign powers who, as traders or otherwise, might seduce 
them into foreign alliances. The King purchased their lands when they 
                                                                                                                                  
13  See, e.g., Brian Slattery, “The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples” (D. Phil 
Thesis, University of Oxford, 1979) [hereinafter “Slattery”]. For an early case, see Mohegan Indians 
v. Connecticut, as discussed in Mark D. Walters, “Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705-1773) and 
the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Laws and Government in British North America” (1995) 
34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 785; Sa’ke’j Henderson, “Unravelling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title” (1977) 
5 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 75. The transaction of lands between Indigenous and settler communities is a 
deep and interesting topic that this paper can only canvass in the most cursory fashion, but the main 
point to be made here is that British settlers almost invariably reached some accommodation with 
Indigenous communities for sharing the land; they could not afford to treat the land as empty, 
because it was in fact not empty. 
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were willing to sell; at a price they were willing to take, but never 
coerced a surrender of them. He also purchased their alliance and 
dependence by subsidies, but never intruded into the interior of their 




As Chief Justice Marshall describes it, the assertions of Crown 
sovereignty at most served to exclude other European powers from 
negotiating treaties with Indigenous communities covered by the 
assertion.
15
 To understand such assertions as granting the Crown 
sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples and title to their lands was, in the 
words of the Chief Justice, an “extravagant and absurd idea”. Even if we 
were to grant the efficacy of the Crown’s claim to sovereignty, the weight 
of common law opinion is that such an assertion did not affect the 
property rights of the inhabitants of those lands, and thus would not have 
any effect on their title to the land.
16
 In common law, then, the right of 
Indigenous communities to be protected by the Crown with respect to 
how the settler community was permitted to use and occupy Indigenous 
lands became known as “Indian title” or “Aboriginal title”. 
This basic legal regime for mediating between Aboriginal and settler 
communities was codified in the Royal Proclamation, 1763 and generally 
commanded compliance by Crown officials in Canada through the 19th and 
early 20th centuries.
17
 The Royal Proclamation stipulated that Aboriginal 
communities were not to be disturbed in their possession of their traditional 
lands absent their consent, and only when such consent was clearly 
                                                                                                                                  
14  31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, at 517 (1832). 
15  Even the idea that the assertion of sovereignty by a European power should be considered 
legally efficacious may be considered fantastical. See, e.g., L.C. Green & Olive P. Dickason, The 
Law of Nations and the New World (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1989), at 4-7, for 
discussion re the Papal Bull Inter caetera, which purported to divide the non-Christian world 
between Spanish and Portuguese sovereignties, which was a foundation for the doctrine of discovery 
as enunciated by Justice Marshall. There are movements around the world that have asked the 
Vatican to revoke the bull; see, e.g., “Revoking the Bull ‘Inter Caetera’ of 1493”, online: 
<http://www.manataka.org/page155.html>.  
16  See Kent McNeil, “Common Law Aboriginal Title” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989), Ch. 6 [hereinafter “McNeil”]; Slattery, supra, note 13, Ch. 2. As Slattery points out (at 3), in 
1763, at the time of the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over much of what is now Canada, the 
population of European descent was approximately equal to those of Indigenous descent, and people 
of European descent had not yet set eyes on most of the lands of Canada, let alone established any 
kind of control of the lands. 
17  See, e.g., the federal government’s map of historical treaties in Canada, online: <http://www. 
aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-text/htoc_1100100032308_eng.pdf>. 
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communicated at a meeting called for that purpose.
18
 When such consent 
was obtained, the Aboriginal title was considered by the Crown to be 
surrendered.
19
 The agreements — the Treaties that are now recognized and 
affirmed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982
20
 — did not merely 
describe agreements about “postage stamp” sized pieces of land. Upper 
Canada Treaty 72 of 1854, for instance, clearly and carefully describes the 
boundaries of a large tract of land that totals about 450,000 acres.
21
 
Similarly, Treaty 11 of 1921 concerns “an area of approximately three 
hundred and seventy-two square miles”.
22
 It is clear that in neither instance 
are “postage stamp” pieces of land at issue in the respective agreements.  
Early judicial interpretation of the treaties seems to affirm the 
territorial conception of Aboriginal title. The view of the Crown assertion 
of sovereignty merely resulting in an exclusive right of the Crown to 
negotiate treaties dealing with Aboriginal title with Aboriginal 
communities, and not in and of itself giving the Crown property rights 
over the land which it could then patent to settlers, was affirmed in the 
seminal case of St. Catharine’s Milling.
23
  
The Judicial Committee, speaking through Lord Watson, explicitly 
equated Aboriginal title, or in the language of the time, “Indian title”, 
with the land interest that was protected through the Royal Proclamation, 
1763.
24
 Lord Watson highlighted the following salient features from the 
Proclamation:  
[I]t was just and reasonable that the several nations and tribes of Indians 
who lived under British protection should not be molested or disturbed in 
the “possession of such parts of Our dominions and territories as, not 
                                                                                                                                  
18  Royal Proclamation, 1763 [reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1]. For more extensive 
discussion, see also Senwung Luk, “Not So Many Hats: The Crown’s Fiduciary Obligations to 
Aboriginal Communities Since Guerin” (2013) 76 Sask. L. Rev. 1, at 4-9 [hereinafter “Luk”]. 
19  Delgamuukw, supra, note 2, at paras. 174-176; St. Catharine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. R. 
(1888), 14 A.C. 46 (J.C.P.C.) [hereinafter “St. Catharine’s Millling”]. As an aside, it is, then, also no 
surprise that contemporary international law, as expressed in the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, echoes this idea with the requirement that “free, prior, and informed 
consent” be obtained from an Indigenous community before the infringement of their land rights. For 
a more extensive discussion, see Senwung Luk, “Justified Infringement – A Minimal Impairment 
Approach” (2013) 25 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 169, at 170-72. 
20  Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
For discussion of this point in Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 6, see para. 4. 
21  Treaty 72, online: <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1370372152585/1370372222012# 
ucls24>.  
22  Treaty 11, online: <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028916/1100100028947>.  
23  Supra, note 19. 
24  Id., at 53-54. 
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having been ceded to or purchased by us, are reserved to them or any of 
them as their hunting grounds,” it is declared that no governor or 
commander-in-chief in any of the new colonies of Quebec, East Florida, 
or West Florida, do presume on any pretence to grant warrants of survey 
or pass any patents for lands beyond the bounds of their respective 
governments, or “until Our further pleasure be known,” upon any lands 
whatever which, not having been ceded or purchased as aforesaid, are 
reserved to the said Indians or any of them.
25
 
This “underlying Indian title” was a “mere burden” on the Crown’s title; 




The prohibition on granting patents on unsurrendered lands, and the 
description of the unsurrendered, reserved lands, as “hunting grounds” 
would seem to suggest a territorial conception of land that is protected 
under the concept of “Indian title” or Aboriginal title. More support for 
this view can be found in the following description of the lands dealt 
with through Treaty 3: 
Commencing at a point on the Pigeon River route where the 
international boundary line between the Territories of Great Britain and 
the United States intersects the height of land separating the waters 
running to Lake Superior from those flowing to Lake Winnipeg; thence 
northerly, westerly and easterly along the height of land aforesaid, 
following its sinuosities, whatever their course may be, to the point at 
which the said height of land meets the summit of the watershed from 
which the streams flow to Lake Nepigon; thence northerly and 
westerly, or whatever may be its course, along the ridge separating the 
waters of the Nepigon and the Winnipeg to the height of land dividing 
the waters of the Albany and the Winnipeg; thence westerly and north-
westerly along the height of land dividing the waters flowing to 
Hudson’s Bay by the Albany or other rivers from those running to 
English River and the Winnipeg to a point on the said height of land 
bearing north forty-five degrees east from Fort Alexander, at the mouth 
of the Winnipeg; thence south forty-five degrees west to Fort 
Alexander, at the mouth of the Winnipeg; thence southerly along the 
eastern bank of the Winnipeg to the mouth of White Mouth River; 
thence southerly by the line described as in that part forming the 
eastern boundary of the tract surrendered by the Chippewa and 
Swampy Cree tribes of Indians to Her Majesty on the third of August, 
                                                                                                                                  
25  Id., at 53. 
26  Id., at 58-60. 
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one thousand eight hundred and seventy-one, namely, by White Mouth 
River to White Mouth Lake, and thence on a line having the general 
bearing of White Mouth River to the forty-ninth parallel of north 
latitude; thence by the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude to the Lake 
of the Woods, and from thence by the international boundary line to the 
place beginning. 
The tract comprised within the lines above described, embracing an 
area of fifty-five thousand square miles, be the same more or less. ...
27
 
It is notable that the Treaty does not ask for anything akin to the 
surrender of “salt licks, narrow defiles between mountains and cliffs, 
particular rocks or promontories used for netting salmon, or … buffalo 
jumps”
28
 or the like. It asks for a territory delimited by an outside 
boundary, and, quite important for the discussion here, explicitly 
embracing an area of 55,000 square miles.  
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada has stated as recently as 2005 
that Treaty 8 dealt with land totalling about 840,000 square kilometres.
29
 It 
would seem that the proposition that Aboriginal communities held title to 
all lands in Canada prior to arrival of Europeans
30
 — or at least that they 
held vast tracts of it — was consistently assumed. 
Yet a major exception to the use of treaties by the Crown to obtain 
the surrender of Aboriginal title was in British Columbia, where, after the 
Vancouver Island treaties were negotiated in the 1850s, the colonial 
government chose to deny that First Nations had any land rights at all, 
and decided to forego entering into treaties with them.
31
 In effect, as a 
matter of policy, the Crown decided to deal with the lands of most of 
British Columbia as if they were terrae nullius. In Atlantic Canada as 
well, the historical treaties that were entered into were Peace and 
Friendship Treaties that generally do not explicitly deal with the sharing 
of the land with settlers.
32
 The problem of Aboriginal title also remains a 
potent source of conflict in the Maritime provinces. 
                                                                                                                                  
27  Treaty 3, online: <http://www.gct3.net/grand-chiefs-office/gct3-info-and-history/government- 
of-canada-document/> (emphasis added). 
28  Tsilhqot’in Nation (C.A.), supra, note 10, at  para. 221. 
29  Mikisew Cree, supra, note 5, at para 2. 
30  See, e.g., Canada v. McMaster, [1926] Ex C.R. 68; R. v. Polchies, [1981] N.B.J. No. 334, 
37 N.B.R. (2d) 546 (N.B. Prov. Ct.) [hereinafter “Polchies”]. 
31  See, e.g., Calder v. British Columbia, [1973] S.C.J. No. 56, [1973] S.C.R. 313, at 334 
(S.C.C.). 
32  See, e.g., R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] S.C.J. No. 44, 2005 SCC 43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marshall / 
Bernard”]; Polchies, supra, note 30. 
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In British Columbia, the pretence that these lands belonged to no one 
would, perhaps inevitably, run into the hard fact that the people who 
lived on those lands at the time of the arrival of colonial authorities were 
never conquered and still exist today. Of the many resources at their 
disposal for resisting colonial claims, some of them chose litigation. 
Such efforts were disrupted by the Parliament of Canada, which enacted 
a provision in the Indian Act prohibiting Aboriginal communities from 
hiring legal counsel without permission of the Minister of Indian 
Affairs.
33
 This prohibition was not repealed until 1951.
34
 
The recommencement of Aboriginal title litigation after the 1951 
repeal of the prohibition on hiring legal counsel culminated in the 1973 
Supreme Court decision in Calder v. British Columbia.
35
 The Court split 
evenly on the question of whether Aboriginal title in British Columbia 
had been extinguished,
36
 but had no trouble agreeing that it did exist at 
the time of the establishment of the colony of British Columbia, and gave 
every indication that Aboriginal title was understood to cover large 
territories. As Judson J., writing for the judges who felt Aboriginal title 
had been extinguished in British Columbia, observed: “the fact is that 
when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and 
occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. This is 
what Indian title means…”.
37
 
Justice Hall’s judgment, opining that Aboriginal title in British 
Columbia was unextinguished, went into even greater detail in 
considering the evidence tendered at trial with respect to the nature of 
Aboriginal title. For example, Hall J. recited expert evidence adduced at 
trial on the nature of the litigant First Nation’s occupation of the land. 
The expert testified that “the ownership of the mouth of the stream and 
the seasonal villages, or habitations that were built there, signify the 
ownership and use of the entire valley”.
38
 Justice Hall further quotes the 
expert: “Even if they didn’t subject the forest to wholesale logging, they 
did establish ownership of tracts used for hunting, trapping and food 
gathering. … Except for barren and inaccessible areas which are not 
utilized even today, every part of the Province was formerly within the 
                                                                                                                                  
33  Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 98, s. 141. 
34  Indian Act, S.C. 1951, c. 29. 
35  [1973] S.C.J. No. 56, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Calder”]. 
36  Per Judson J., who held that it had been extinguished, at 344, id.; per Hall J., who held  
at 422 that it had not. 
37  Calder, supra, note 35, at 328. 
38  Id., at 361. 
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owned and recognized territory of one or other of the Indian Tribes.”
39
 
Justice Hall’s judgment is a landmark of Canadian jurisprudence on 
Aboriginal title; it is clear that he did not conceive of it as covering only 
“postage stamp” pieces of territory. 
In light of the split result in Calder, some First Nations in British 
Columbia chose to pursue further litigation. Aboriginal title litigation 
reached the Supreme Court of Canada again in 1997 in Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia. Most notably for the purposes of this paper, 
Delgamuukw established a test for an Aboriginal community to meet if it 
is to secure the Canadian legal system’s recognition of its land rights. 
In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court of Canada established that for an 
Aboriginal community to prove Aboriginal title, it must show that the 
land in question was occupied by the First Nation at the time of the 
assertion of British sovereignty.
40
 The occupation must have been 
exclusive, or, if other Aboriginal groups were present, then title can be 
proven by showing that the community had the intent and capacity to 
retain exclusive control.
41
 Evidence to prove this could arise in different 
ways.
42
 The community could bring forward evidence of laws of the 
community about those lands: 
[T]he aboriginal perspective on the occupation of their lands can be 
gleaned, in part, but not exclusively, from their traditional laws, 
because those laws were elements of the practices, customs and 
traditions of aboriginal peoples. ... As a result, if, at the time of 
sovereignty, an aboriginal society had laws in relation to land, those 
laws would be relevant to establishing the occupation of lands which 
are the subject of a claim for aboriginal title. Relevant laws might 




The community could also bring forward evidence of physical 
occupation. As the Court said: 
Physical occupation may be established in a variety of ways, ranging 
from the construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of 
fields to regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or 
otherwise exploiting its resources. ... In considering whether occupation 
                                                                                                                                  
39  Id., at 62. 
40  Delgamuukw, supra, note 2, at para. 143. 
41  Id., at para. 156. 
42  Id., at paras. 146-151. 
43  Id., at para. 148 (citation omitted). 
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sufficient to ground title is established, “one must take into account the 
group’s size, manner of life, material resources, and technological 
abilities, and the character of the lands claimed”... .
44
  
Evidence from these sources could be adduced to prove exclusive 
occupation. Once title is proven, the Aboriginal community is entitled to 
exclusive occupation of its title lands, subject to the possibility that the 
Crown can show that its infringement of the title lands is justified.
45
 In 
Delgamuukw itself, this test for proof of title was never applied to the 
facts because the Supreme Court of Canada ordered a new trial in  
the case.
46
 The Court held that the trial judge had erred in his handling of 
the oral history evidence during the trial, and that the factual findings 
could not form a sufficient basis for the Court to decide the case.
47
  
The Supreme Court of Canada next had the opportunity to consider 
the Delgamuukw test in Marshall / Bernard.
48
 In those appeals, heard 
jointly before the Court, the accused had cut timber on lands that the 
Crown asserted were Crown lands.
49
 As a defence, the accused pleaded 
that they had cut the timber from lands on which the communities of the 
respective accused held Aboriginal title. As noted above, the Maritime 
provinces, from which these appeals arose, are not subject to land 
surrender treaties; rather, the treaties that apply there are of the peace and 
friendship variety. The Supreme Court seemed to proceed on the basis of 




Speaking for five of seven justices of the Supreme Court, 
McLachlin C.J.C. held against the accused. In considering the defence 
of having logged on Aboriginal title lands, the Chief Justice employed a 
physical occupation test. Citing Delgamuukw, she held that physical 
occupation “may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from the 
construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to 
regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise 
exploiting its resources”.
51
 The Chief Justice explained this standard in 
the following way: 
                                                                                                                                  
44  Id., at para. 149 (citations omitted). 
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46  Id., at para. 108. 
47  Id., at para. 107. 
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49  Id., at para. 1. 
50  Id., at para. 38. 
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It follows from the requirement of exclusive occupation that exploiting 
the land, rivers or seaside for hunting, fishing or other resources may 
translate into aboriginal title to the land if the activity was sufficiently 
regular and exclusive to comport with title at common law. However, 
more typically, seasonal hunting and fishing rights exercised in a 
particular area will translate to a hunting or fishing right. This is plain 
from this Court’s decisions in Van der Peet, Nikal, Adams and Côté. In 
those cases, aboriginal peoples asserted and proved ancestral utilization 
of particular sites for fishing and harvesting the products of the sea. 
Their forebears had come back to the same place to fish or harvest each 
year since time immemorial. However, the season over, they left, and 
the land could be traversed and used by anyone. These facts gave rise 
not to aboriginal title, but to aboriginal hunting and fishing rights.
52
 
In contrast, the Chief Justice held that the inquiry must look for 
concepts in Aboriginal societies that were “notions of exclusive physical 
possession equivalent to common law notions of title”, observing that 
“[t]hey often exercised such control over their village sites and larger 
areas of land which they exploited for agriculture, hunting, fishing or 
gathering”.
53
 She continued by questioning “whether nomadic and semi-
nomadic peoples can ever claim title to land”,
54
 but seemed to suggest 
that the issue should be decided on the facts:  
The right to control the land and, if necessary, to exclude others from 
using it is basic to the notion of title at common law. In European-based 
systems, this right is assumed by dint of law. Determining whether it was 
present in a pre-sovereignty aboriginal society, however, can pose 
difficulties. Often, no right to exclude arises by convention or law. So one 
must look to evidence. But evidence may be hard to find. The area may 
have been sparsely populated, with the result that clashes and the need to 
exclude strangers seldom if ever occurred. Or the people may have been 
peaceful and have chosen to exercise their control by sharing rather than 




The Chief Justice stressed further the fact-specific nature of the 
inquiry: 
The second sub-issue is whether nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples 
can ever claim title to aboriginal land, as distinguished from rights to 
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53  Id., at para. 62. 
54  Id., at para. 63. 
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use the land in traditional ways. The answer is that it depends on the 
evidence. As noted above, possession at common law is a contextual, 
nuanced concept. Whether a nomadic people enjoyed sufficient 
“physical possession” to give them title to the land, is a question of fact, 
depending on all the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land 
and the manner in which it is commonly used. Not every nomadic 
passage or use will ground title to land; thus this Court in Adams 
asserts that one of the reasons that aboriginal rights cannot be 
dependent on aboriginal title is that this would deny any aboriginal 
rights to nomadic peoples (para. 27). On the other hand, Delgamuukw 
contemplates that “physical occupation” sufficient to ground title to 
land may be established by “regular use of definite tracts of land for 
hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its resources” (para. 149). In 
each case, the question is whether a degree of physical occupation or 
use equivalent to common law title has been made out.
56
 
The Court’s approach in Marshall / Bernard suggested a restrictive 
understanding of Aboriginal title. Moreover, amid all the discussion of 
the test for physical occupation, the Chief Justice’s majority opinion did 
not address the possibility laid out in Delgamuukw of using evidence of 
Aboriginal laws to prove Aboriginal title, as the concurring judgment of 
LeBel J.
57
 and other commentators have observed.
58
  
The jurisprudential background for the first application of the 
Delgamuukw test was in the trial decision of Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British 
Columbia,
59
 in which the trial judge, after 339 trial days, declined to 
decide the Aboriginal title issue.
60
 He declined to decide the case on the 
basis of the law of pleadings, which is meant to prevent any litigant from 
being surprised by being confronted with arguments beyond what her 
opponent had pleaded that he would argue. He found that there was 
sufficient evidence to result in a declaration of Aboriginal title over lands 
that were in a somewhat different configuration than lands that had been 
described in the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s pleadings. However, he declined to 
make a declaration of Aboriginal title because this different configuration 
of lands might have surprised the Crown. Instead, the trial judge spent 
about 1,400 paragraphs in his decision evaluating the evidence that had 
                                                                                                                                  
56  Id., at para. 66. 
57  Id., at paras. 130, 140. 
58  Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What’s Happening?” (2006) 69 
Sask L. Rev. 281, at 302-305 [hereinafter “McNeil, ‘What’s Happening?’”]. 
59  Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2465, 2007 BCSC 1700 
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been put before him, to form “only an expression of opinion I have made 
to assist the parties in the negotiations that lie ahead”.
61
 He found that the 
date of assertion of Crown sovereignty was 1846, the date of the Oregon 
Boundary Treaty between Britain and the United States.
62
 He gave an 
opinion that Aboriginal title could be found over certain large tracts of 
Tsilhqot’in traditional territory, though not over the entire area described 
by the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s claim.
63
 
At the Court of Appeal, the unanimous panel reversed the trial 
judge’s finding on the pleadings issue, finding that the trial judge would 
have been within his rights to grant the declaration of Aboriginal title 
even though the declaration would have been over a different area than 
what had been pleaded, since “[t]here is no general rule of pleading that 
either requires declarations to be pleaded precisely or that precludes a 
court from granting a declaration that is less sweeping than the one 
sought by the plaintiff”.
64
 Yet the Court of Appeal denied the First Nation 
the declaration of Aboriginal title — and instead of basing the denial 
on the law of pleadings as the British Columbia Supreme Court had done, 
the Court of Appeal based its holding squarely within the law of 
Aboriginal title. 
The Court of Appeal characterized the debate as being between two 
rival views of Aboriginal title — the territorial theory and the “postage 
stamp” theory
65
 — and as a matter of law, it rejected the former and 
espoused the latter.  
In considering the evidence, the Court of Appeal found that “[e]xcept 
in respect of a few specific sites, the evidence did not establish regular 
presence on or intensive occupation of particular tracts of land within the 
Claim Area. There were no permanent village sites, though there was 
evidence of encampments and wintering sites, including groupings of pit 
houses.”
66
 It also found that only a few locations were used intensively 
by the Tsilhqot’in Nation, and that the Tsilhqot’in did not cultivate or 
enclose fields.
67
 On the Court of Appeal’s view of the evidence, it 
rejected the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s “territorial” claim to Aboriginal title: 
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63  Id., at paras. 946-962. 
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66  Id., at para. 215. 
67  Id., at para. 216. 
304 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
I do not see a broad territorial claim as fitting within the purposes 
behind s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 or the rationale for the 
common law’s recognition of Aboriginal title. Finally, I see broad 
territorial claims to title as antithetical to the goal of reconciliation, 
which demands that, so far as possible, the traditional rights of First 
Nations be fully respected without placing unnecessary limitations on 




The Court of Appeal continued: 
As I read Delgamuukw, Aboriginal title cannot generally be proven on 
a territorial basis, even if there is some evidence showing that the 
claimant was the only group in a region or that it attempted to exclude 
outsiders from what it considered to be its traditional territory. 
I acknowledge that Delgamuukw did not fully address the quality of 
occupancy that was necessary to support a title claim, apart from 
indicating that the occupancy must have been exclusive. That said, 
several passages in Delgamuukw strongly suggest that an intensive 
presence at a particular site was what the Court had in mind. 
In particular, I note that the examples of title lands given at para. 149 of 
Delgamuukw are well-defined, intensively used areas. The reference to 
hunting, fishing and other resource extraction activities is coupled with 
a specific description of the lands so used as ‘definite’ tracts of land. 
I agree with British Columbia’s assertion that what was contemplated 
were specific sites on which hunting, fishing, or resource extraction 
activities took place on a regular and intensive basis. Examples might 
include salt licks, narrow defiles between mountains and cliffs, 
particular rocks or promontories used for netting salmon, or, in other 
areas of the country, buffalo jumps.
69
 
This restrictive view of Aboriginal title was what the Supreme Court 
so forcefully rejected in Tsilhqot’in Nation to arrive at the first ever 
judicial declaration of Aboriginal title in Canadian history. In a 
unanimous opinion drafted by the Chief Justice, the Court held that to 
make out Aboriginal title, the Aboriginal community must show 
occupation of the land prior to the assertion of European sovereignty. 
Such occupation “must possess three characteristics. It must be sufficient; 
it must be continuous (where present occupation is relied on); and it must 
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be exclusive.”
70
 The Chief Justice held that the Court of Appeal had erred 
in its construction of the sufficiency requirement.
71
 In the Supreme 
Court’s view, “[t]he question of sufficient occupation must be 
approached from both the common law perspective and the Aboriginal 
perspective ...”.
72
 In this view, “[t]he Aboriginal perspective focuses on 
laws, practices, customs and traditions of the group”,
73
 which “must take 
into account the group’s size, manner of life, material resources, and 
technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed”.
74
 For the 
Court, “[t]he common law perspective imports the idea of possession and 
control of the lands. At common law, possession extends beyond sites 
that are physically occupied, like a house, to surrounding lands that are 
used and over which effective control is exercised.”
75
  
For the Court, these perspectives must be reconciled to each other for 
a context-specific consideration of the evidence. The intensity and 
frequency of the occupation that could be sufficient to make out 
Aboriginal title “may vary with the characteristics of the Aboriginal 
group asserting title and the character of the land over which title is 
asserted”.
76
 The Court found that the carrying capacity of the land would 
be relevant in considering whether a small population spread out over a 
large land area could establish title. The Court also found that the historic 
Aboriginal community must have communicated to outsiders “that it 
held the land for its own purposes”,
77
 but that “the kinds of acts 
necessary to indicate a permanent presence and intention to hold and use 
the land for the group’s purposes are dependent on the manner of life of 
the people and the nature of the land”.
78
 
Reflecting upon the previous Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court 
held that in Delgamuukw, and through Marshall / Bernard, a territorial 
conception of Aboriginal title was always what the Court had contemplated, 
and that the “postage stamp” theory was never suggested.
79
 Contrary to 
the Court of Appeal’s view that a territorial conception of Aboriginal title 
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was antithetical to reconciliation, the Supreme Court found that the 
territorial conception was exactly what reconciliation required.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation is a momentous 
step for the Canadian legal system. As suggested in the canvassing of the 
historical context of Aboriginal title in Canada, the normal situation in 
Canadian history was one in which the land rights of Indigenous peoples 
were recognized, such as through treaty and purchase. The denial of 
Indigenous land rights through the legal fiction of terra nullius is the 
exceptional case, most notably being the fiction under which the settler 
state operated in British Columbia. The view of the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal in this case ran the risk of entrenching the fiction (with 
the exception of salt licks, salmon rocks and buffalo jumps, of course) 
against the better judgment of courts and Crown officials throughout 
much of Canadian history. The decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation decisively 
charts a course away from the fiction of terra nullius. Yet, as this paper 
will now argue, it can only be a beginning of the process of reconciling 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities in Canada, and not the end, 
as the recognition of Indigenous legal orders must also be a part of this 
process.  
III. LAW OF THE LAND: RECOGNITION OF INDIGENOUS LEGAL 
ORDERS THROUGH THE DOCTRINE OF ABORIGINAL TITLE 
Besides affirming that the proper basis for the recognition of 
Aboriginal title is territorial, the Supreme Court also affirmed that 
evidence of Indigenous laws can constitute proof of Aboriginal title.
80
 
This sets out a basis for the recognition of Indigenous legal orders by the 
Canadian legal system. What this looks like in practical terms, and why 
this kind of recognition is essential for the reconciliation of Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous people in Canada, will be illustrated through the 
examples that this section of the paper will lay out. It suggests that a 
helpful precedent might be found in the way that English law has treated 
English ecclesiastical law. 
This paper began with an epigraph citing a popular “emigrant guide” 
of the 19th century, suggesting that Canada “is too matter-of-fact country 
for … supernaturals to visit”.
81
 This is a specimen of a colonial mindset 
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that pushes Indigenous peoples off the page, off the land, and out of 
mind. Of course the land was not devoid of spirits, of “historical 
associations” or “legendary tales” when European settlers arrived in the 
19th century. A settler could only cling to that vision by assiduously 
avoiding any meaningful interaction with Aboriginal people. If Canadian 
law were to focus on physical occupation of the land at the expense of 
consideration of evidence of Indigenous laws and Indigenous 
perspectives on land use, it risks, in the words of Parr Traill, banishing 
the spirits from the land, looking upon it “with the curious eye of natural 
philosophy alone”.
82
 A true reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal Canadians must involve moving beyond such a colonialist 
viewpoint. Indigenous occupation of the land consists of more than just 
artifacts, footsteps and other physical evidence. It also includes the land 
as a site for spirituality, history and narratives. This is the promise of the 
recognition of Indigenous laws through the Aboriginal title doctrine, one 
that allows for the possibility of beginning to move away from Canadian 
law’s Eurocentric roots.  
An approach to Aboriginal title that focused on evidence of physical 
occupation at the expense of evidence of Indigenous legal orders risks 
ignoring evidence of the most important aspects of any society, 
Indigenous ones included. Consider a hypothetical situation where an 
Aboriginal community is aware of the existence of a burial ground. The 
same community has a legal prohibition against disturbing the burial 
site.
83
 As a consequence, members of the community avoid the area, in 
order to avoid disturbing the burials, in conformity with the rule of the 
Indigenous legal order. How should this piece of land be considered if 
there was a claim for Aboriginal title?  
In the trial decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation, the findings of which were 
affirmed by the Supreme Court, evidence of Tsilhqot’in law was not 
extensively considered. In reasons that were almost 1,400 paragraphs in 
length, evidence of Tsilhqot’in law was only considered in seven paragraphs. 
                                                                                                                                  
82  Id. 
83  Consider, for instance, a norm in Anishinabe law: “It is the obligation of the Living to 
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Nation v. Ontario (Minister of the Environment), [2007] O.J. No. 506, 221 O.A.C. 113, at para. 45 
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This may have been due to the uncertain status of Indigenous laws as 
proof of Aboriginal title after the Marshall / Bernard decision,
84
 an 
uncertainty that has been decisively resolved in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation. Nonetheless, perhaps because of the 
paucity of evidence on Tsilhqot’in law canvassed by the trial judge, such 
evidence was also not extensively considered by the Supreme Court’s 
reasons for judgment, which focused mainly on evidence of physical 
occupation. 
In Tsilhqot’in Nation at the Court of Appeal, the Court found that 
title can only be found in “well-defined, intensively used areas”,
85
 
“specific sites on which hunting, fishing, or resource extraction activities 
took place on a regular and intensive basis”.
86
 The Supreme Court has 
rightly rejected this approach to Aboriginal title. It stressed the 
importance of evidence of Indigenous legal orders in proving Aboriginal 
title.
87
 However, perhaps because the facts found at trial were so centred 
on physical occupation, its enunciation of the sufficiency of occupation 
test also centred on physical factors. The Court held that the 
“characteristics of the Aboriginal group” and the “carrying capacity of 
the land” were factors to be considered in gauging the degree of 
occupation necessary to prove title.
88
 Yet the Court also said that 
communicating to third parties that they were to be excluded from a 
piece of land would also be sufficient to establish sufficiency of 
occupation.
89
 Such a standard seems to incorporate prohibitions within 
Indigenous legal orders on access to a site, such as the hypothetical 
situation of the burial site considered here. However, the precise way in 
which Canadian law would approach the situation of the land on which 
physical occupation is prohibited has not been clearly defined. Yet it 
seems that land of this nature should be the par excellence example of 
land over which an Aboriginal community should be recognized as 
having title. It is exactly the kind of land for which Canadian law should 
recognize their right to exclude others, and to be able to make decisions 
as a community concerning the land. 
It may surprise many Canadian lawyers to discover that just this kind 
of co-existence has been part of the English law for centuries. What 
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follows in this paper is an analogy to the recognition of laws on land 
access and ownership in English common law, which has had centuries 
of experience with living and growing alongside English ecclesiastical 
law. As the Supreme Court has stated, the law of Aboriginal title ought to 
take into account the perspective of the common law.
90
 The experience of 
the common law in this regard, therefore, should be an instructive 
example for the development of the Canadian law of Aboriginal title. 
This experience of the common law in co-existing with ecclesiastical law 
should be especially pertinent as the Supreme Court has suggested 
repeatedly that the law of Aboriginal title should take the perspective of 
the common law into account.
91
  
First, to contextualize the discussion a little, it is important to note 
that the term “common law” actually has broader and narrower 
meanings. For instance, equity had its own legal doctrines and its own 
system of courts before the courts of common law and equity were fused. 
Nowadays, the broader understanding of the term “common law” 
includes equity. For example, no education in the common law would be 
complete without education in equity. Yet in the narrower understanding, 
common law doctrines on contracts exclude equitable contractual 
doctrines. 
The relationship between common law and English ecclesiastical law 
may be thought of in a similar way. However, unlike the courts of equity, 
which have been fused with the common law courts and hence no longer 
have a separate existence, ecclesiastical law still has its own legal 
doctrines and parallel court system to some extent, although the 
jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts is subject to some constraints 
imposed by the English Court of Queen’s Bench,
92
 and the Judicial 




Under English law, until the mid-19th century, around the time of the 
Crown assertion of sovereignty over British Columbia, and well after its 
assertion of sovereignty over the rest of Canada, burial sites in England 
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were principally governed by ecclesiastical law.
94
 It was only starting in 
the mid-19th century, when more and more people did not wish to be 
buried in land consecrated under the law of the Church of England, that 
Parliament enacted statutes enabling land to be set aside for cemeteries, 
and for those cemeteries to be governed according to non-ecclesiastical 
land law. 
Thus, prior to the mid-19th century, generally speaking Christian 
cemeteries were governed by ecclesiastical law, and even after the 
19th century reforms, Church of England churchyards, whether constructed 
before the reforms or after, are still so governed. Under ecclesiastical 
law, a bishop has the authority to consecrate land by signing the Sentence 
of Consecration.
95
 Once this has happened, the land becomes 
“consecrated land” and restricted to “sacred uses”.
96
 Whether a use is 
considered sacred is a matter for the ecclesiastical courts to determine.
97
 
The boundary of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction extends to the unconsecrated 
“curtilage”, meaning “the land around or immediately contiguous to, and 
belonging to, a building”.
98
 Within the consecrated land and its curtilage, 
it is “impossible to create a legal estate, save under authority of an Act of 
Parliament or a Measure”,
99
 and the jurisdiction of the secular, common 
law courts is ousted.
100
 Under ecclesiastical law, the exhumation of 
burials is prohibited, and may only be done where permission is granted 
by an ecclesiastical court.
101
 English ecclesiastical law provides for 
“decent and undisturbed interment”,
102
 and exhumation should only be 
permitted in exceptional cases.
103
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The consecration of a burial ground under ecclesiastical law is a 
matter of law, and a lack of intensive physical occupation is not sufficient 
to defeat the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. In the 1962 case of 
Re St. John’s, Chelsea, the land in question was consecrated for a church 
in 1876. A neighbouring parcel, left unconsecrated, was used as a 
vicarage.
104
 In 1940, German air raids demolished both the church and 
the vicarage, and for 20 years after, the site was “unoccupied and more or 
less level”.
105
 A proponent proposed building a gas station on the site 
where the vicarage had stood, and a parking lot on the consecrated 
ground where the church had stood. The ecclesiastical court denied 
permission to go ahead with these plans. It held that the disuse of the 
land could not cause the land to become deconsecrated; only an Act of 
Parliament or a Measure of the Church of England could do that.
106
 The 




Ecclesiastical law is not thought to be a part of the common law that 
was received into the colonies, including Canada, although that was not a 
settled position for much of Canada’s colonial history.
108
 My intention 
here is not to argue that ecclesiastical law applies as law in Canada, but 
only to show the adaptability of common law principles and doctrines to 
other bodies of law. Such adaptability is not merely a feature of the past, 
but continues to the present day,
109
 and forms part of the “common law 
perspective” that the Supreme Court has held is essential to fleshing out 
the law of Aboriginal title. The ecclesiastical courts today still maintain 
jurisdiction over consecrated churchyards in England. Generally all pre-
mid-19th century Christian burial sites in England, therefore, are 
governed under a body of law that is not part of the common law 
narrowly understood. Yet it cannot be said that the Church of England’s 
jurisdiction over these English sacred sites has somehow caused the 
English economy to grind to a halt, or placed the Church of England in a 
position of intractable conflict with English society, or, in the Court of 
Appeal’s words, “antithetical to reconciliation”. Indeed, many people, the 
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author included, have found the churchyards in the middle of English 
towns to be endearing places to visit and linger for quiet reflection. 
It would seem that the kind of recognition by the Canadian legal 
system of Aboriginal legal orders, and those orders’ jurisdiction over 
certain lands, as contemplated in Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in Nation, is 
not drastically different conceptually from the relationship between the 
ecclesiastical courts and the British legal system. Under the Canadian 
law of Aboriginal title, where an Aboriginal community proves its title, 
the land is held communally.
110
 This means that decisions about its use 
are subject to the legal processes for decision-making that exist within 
the community.
111
 Moreover, the nature of Aboriginal title as being 
inalienable except to the Crown
112
 means that decisions of the 
community about alienating the land to the Crown will be governed by 
the laws of the Aboriginal community.
113
  
Consider the parallels of such a relationship with that between 
ecclesiastical law and the British legal system. Decisions about the use of 
consecrated land are the exclusive purview of the ecclesiastical authorities, 
governed by ecclesiastical law, as applied by the ecclesiastical courts. 
Decisions about whether to deconsecrate a piece of ecclesiastical property 
are made exclusively by ecclesiastical authorities, also governed by 
ecclesiastical law, as applied by the ecclesiastical courts. In extraordinary 
cases, the state legal system can override these decisions through an Act 
of Parliament. 
It is also interesting to observe that the state legal system in both 
cases has nonetheless asserted authority to override ecclesiastical land 
law in England’s case, and Aboriginal title in Canada’s case. Under the 
British legal system, the only way for the decision of the Church of 
England to be overridden is through an Act of Parliament. In Canada, 
Aboriginal title is protected as a constitutional right and trumps ordinary 
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legislation,
114
 but the right is subject to justified infringement. As the 
Supreme Court has stated, the objectives of government action infringing 
Aboriginal title must be substantial and compelling.
115
 However, such 
infringements must also be consistent with the Crown’s role as fiduciary 
for Aboriginal peoples, cannot destroy the land and its benefits for future 
generations, and can only minimally infringe the rights available under 
Aboriginal title.
116
 Moreover, Canadian law provides for an additional 
gatekeeper against assertions of Aboriginal title. Whereas under English 
law, the common law courts will respect the decisions of the ecclesiastical 
courts about the boundaries and extent of consecrated ground, the 
Canadian courts mediate between Aboriginal law and common law land 
law, requiring that Aboriginal title be proven to a common law court before 
recognizing the jurisdiction of the Aboriginal community.
117
  
The fact of the co-existence between English common law and 
English ecclesiastical law suggests that the accommodation of spiritual 
values in land use is not incompatible with the common law, but is in fact 
a time-honoured element of the common law. It hints at the co-existence 
that is possible between the Canadian legal system and a revitalized and 
robust set of Indigenous legal orders.  
It may be helpful at this stage to contrast the protection afforded to 
English burials with the protection afforded to Aboriginal burials in 
Canada, to show the kinds of frictions that currently exist at the interface 
of Canadian state law and Indigenous law. We can use Ontario’s regime as 
a representative example.
118
 In Ontario, upon the discovery of human 
remains, the Registrar of Cemeteries, under the Ministry of Consumer 
Services, must be notified.
119
 The Registrar may then order an 
investigation into the site.
120
 The Registrar has the discretion to determine 
whether the site is an “[A]boriginal peoples burial ground”, or merely a 
“burial ground” or an “irregular burial site”.
121
 Upon the finding that the 
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land is an “[A]boriginal peoples burial ground”, the Registrar has some 
discretion over which First Nation to give notice to.
122
 The Registrar then 
seeks to convince the parties involved (e.g., a First Nation and a property 
developer) to come to a “site disposition agreement”, failing which the 
Registrar may compel the parties to enter into arbitration.
123
 
Several differences are of note when compared to the English regime. 
First, the Canadian state actually has very little information with respect to 
the traditional knowledge of Aboriginal communities. Not having gained 
the trust of traditional knowledge-holders, government officials may have 
access to very little of the knowledge that a community may have about 
the land. Hence, unlike in England, burials in Ontario are likely to be 
discovered in the act of excavation, which is in itself a disturbance. 
Second, in the absence of a recognition of Aboriginal title, the Registrar in 
Ontario retains full authority throughout the process, and the authority of 
the First Nation with respect to burial grounds is not recognized in any 
substantive way by Ontario law, such that the final decision about what 
happens to the land comes through an arbitrator.
124
 Third, the expected 
outcome is a “site disposition agreement”, which does not exclude, or even 
express a preference against, the disturbance of the burial by excavation 
and reburial elsewhere. Of course, the Ontario regime also does not 
provide for lands that may have been set aside by First Nations as a place 
of repose for cremated ashes, and in such cases there will be no discovery 
of bones to alert the Canadian state to the desecration and disturbance that 
is taking place. As is evident, the current regime in Ontario struggles to 
recognize the sacred nature of burial sites and can become the source of 
serious friction between Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities. The 
recognition of Indigenous legal orders by the Canadian state may be a 
more promising vehicle for allowing the kind of reconciliation envisioned 
by the Supreme Court. 
In its relationship with ecclesiastical law, the common law in 
England accommodates ancient English traditions that continue to the 
present day. This relationship offers a valuable model for how a 
reconciled, post-colonial relationship might operate between the 
Canadian state and Aboriginal traditions that continue to the present day. 
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This framework is applicable not only to burial sites, but to other sacred or 
spiritual sites as well. In England, this extends to sacred lands such as 
churches and churchyards. In Canada, more research and engagement by 
the state with Aboriginal communities would need to be done to inventory 
what an analogous category might include,
125
 but the importance of such 
conflicts as borne out in the case law suggests a serious engagement with 
the issue by the law of Aboriginal title would go a long way to alleviating 
many of the conflicts over sacred and spiritual sites that currently take 
place.
126
 It may be the case that the boundaries around sacred sites of First 
Nations are not demarcated as precisely as consecrated ground would be 
under ecclesiastical law,
127
 but from the perspective of reconciliation, 
engaging with Aboriginal communities to learn about where the centres of 
the sacred sites are, and what buffers and other legal regulations may be 
necessary to protect them, would certainly be a step forward from living in 
ignorance of them. 
Moreover, Indigenous legal orders not only govern sacred uses of 
land, but also uses that include economic or subsistence uses as well.
128
 
Here is a hypothetical example: the hunting territory of a family may be 
set at the beginning of the season by the First Nation as a whole, and 
disputes about the boundary of the territory may be resolved by the 
community in council. These would be the kinds of Indigenous legal 
orders that seem capable of being proof of Aboriginal title. The 
relationship between the English legal system and ecclesiastical law 
provides an example of how the Canadian legal system could relate to 
laws about the sacred within Indigenous legal orders, and to other laws 
on land use as well. The manner in which English law treats English 
burial sites can be a model for how Canadian law can treat sites of 
spiritual importance for Aboriginal communities. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For most of the history of the relationship between Aboriginal 
communities and the Crown, the treaty was the main device for 
relationship-building. As is apparent from the brief canvassing earlier in 
this paper of the history of treaties, the Crown acknowledged historical 
fact and did not challenge the fact that First Nations have territories. 
Indeed, this assumption is the basis for treaty-making. Thomas Berger, 
counsel for the Nisga’a in Calder, observed in the following anecdote 
from the 1970s: 
The senior counsel for the government of British Columbia was 
Douglas McKay Brown, who was the leading civil litigator in the 
province at that time. He stood at the head of the profession and his 
junior, if you will, was a veteran lawyer in the A.G.’s [attorney 
general’s] ministry, Bill Hobbs. … Doug Brown didn’t take it 
altogether seriously. … But Bill Hobbs did. And he said: “We realize 
there is an argument here and we’ve got to meet it, and we were going 
through the pleadings, that is, formal allegations made by the Nisga’a 
Tribal Council about the history of the Nass Valley.” And we said: 
“The Nisga’a have lived there since time immemorial. They’ve used, 
developed and occupied the land. That is something of course you have 
to establish to argue Aboriginal title.” I can still remember Doug 
Brown saying to Bill Hobbs: “Well is there any dispute about this?” 
And Bill Hobbs said: “Well, they’ve been there since time immemorial. 
They’ve used and occupied the land and they are still there.” Doug 
Brown said: “Well, we’ll admit that.” In Aboriginal land claims cases 
today, that’s two or three years of anthropological evidence and Elders 
and oral history, but they did the right thing. That’s what the attorney 
general, representing Her Majesty, is supposed to do. If something 
ought to be admitted, it should be admitted. …
129
 
Of course, as Berger observes, quite a different approach is taken by 
the Crown in Aboriginal litigation these days. (Some of this reticence 
may be due to the more recent awareness of competing claims of First 
Nations, but there is nothing to suggest that lands not subject to any such 
competing claims could not simply be recognized by the Crown as 
Aboriginal title lands.) One reason the Tsilhqot’in Nation trial took over 
339 trial days is because the fact of the presence of the Tsilhqot’in on the 
                                                                                                                                  
129  “Frank Calder and Thomas Berger: A Conversation” in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven & 
Jeremy Webber, eds., Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of 
Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011) 37, at 43. 
(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE LAW OF THE LAND 317 
land became a litigation issue.
130
 Once it becomes a litigation issue, the 
onus lies on the plaintiff — the Aboriginal litigant — to meet the onus of 
the burden of proof.
131
 This is the opposite of how Aboriginal title has 
been dealt with historically. 
Although the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision was a momentous first for 
the judicial recognition of Aboriginal title in Canada, it is important to 
remember that the area claimed in the litigation was only five per cent of 
what the Tsilhqot’in Nation considered their traditional territory, and the 
area declared to be Aboriginal title lands was only a portion of that 
five per cent.
132
 Yet the Supreme Court’s unanimous judgment in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation provides a solid basis for moving away from the debate between 
the “postage stamp” conception and the territorial conception of 
Aboriginal title, and may empower Aboriginal communities to pursue 
more robust claims. By reaffirming the role of Indigenous laws in the 
process of proving Aboriginal title, the Supreme Court has provided a 
solid basis for the recognition of the land laws of Canada’s First Peoples 
as the law of the land. This paper has modestly suggested that the 
arrangements for such recognition in England may serve as a model for 
Canadian law, so that Aboriginal traditions may receive as much respect 
and recognition from the Canadian state as English ones do from the 
British state. This comparison seems to be a pretty good proxy of how 
much the Canadian legal system is still pushing Indigenous narratives off 
the page and off the land, and how much ground remains to be covered 
on the road to reconciliation. 
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